Abstract. In this paper, we show that preferences intervene twice in argumentation frameworks: i) to compute standard solutions, and ii) to refine those solutions. The two roles are independent and obey to distinct postulates. After introducing and studying the postulates, we provide an example of a formal framework which models the two roles and verifies all the proposed postulates.
Preferences in Argumentation: Informal Discussion
In what follows, we assume that F = (A, R) is an arbitrary argumentation framework where A is finite. Let ≥ be a binary relation that expresses preferences between arguments of A. For instance, an argument may be preferred to another if it is grounded on more certain information, or if it promotes a more important value. Throughout the paper, the relation ≥ ⊆ A × A is assumed to be a preorder (i.e. reflexive and transitive). For arguments a and b, writing a ≥ b (or (a, b) ∈ ≥) means that a is at least as strong as b. The relation > is the strict version of ≥. Indeed a > b iff a ≥ b and not (b ≥ a).
Let us now analyze the role that preferences between arguments can play in an argumentation framework. We will discuss different critical examples.
Example 1 (Cont):
If we assume that a > b and c > d, then the stable extension {a, c} is better than {b, d} since each element of the latter is weaker than an element of the former. Thus, F 2 would have only {a, c} as its preferred stable extension.
It is worth mentioning that preferences in Example 1 refine the results obtained in the standard case. Indeed, the set of preferred solutions is a subset of the set of the standard ones. Preferences play here exactly the role described in nonmonotonic logic formalisms. Let us now consider a different example. Contrarily to Example 1, the use of preferences in Example 2 completely modifies the original set of extensions. Consequently, the preferred solutions of a framework are not necessarily a subset of the standard ones. This is not surprising since preferences in this case are used in order to compute the standard solutions. Thus, {b} is a standard solution. Preferred solutions refine the standard ones. In this example, {b} is the only standard solution, thus it is also the unique preferred solution.
Example 2 Let
It is also worth mentioning that when preferences are used for computing the standard solutions of an argumentation framework, not all available preferences are exploited. Only those which conflict with the attacks, as in Example 2, are used. Consequently, the result which is returned may need to be refined as shown in the following example. In sum, two roles of preferences are distinguished:
Example 3 Let us consider the argumentation framework
1. To weaken the critical attacks (i.e. the attacks which conflict with the preferences) in an AF, and thus to compute intuitive standard solutions. 2. To refine the standard solutions computed in the first role.
Example 2 shows that a refinement does not solve the problem of critical attacks and Example 3 shows that the first role is not sufficient and its results may need to be refined as the first role does not exploit all the available preferences.
Handling critical attacks
The aim of this section is to propose the basic postulates that any preference-based argumentation framework (PAF) should satisfy. We focus here on the use of preferences for computing the standard solutions, thus for modeling the first role of preferences.
Definition 4 (PAF)
A preference-based argumentation framework (PAF) is a tuple T = (A, R, ≥) where A is a set of arguments, R is an attack relation and ≥ is partial or total preorder on A.
Note that we do not show how arguments are evaluated in such a PAF. In fact, we do not focus on a particular approach, but we propose postulates that any approach should satisfy. Before presenting those postulates, let us first define formally critical attacks.
Definition 5 (Critical attack) Let
The role of preferences which consists of handling critical attacks has already been identified in the literature, namely in [2, 4, 5, 10] . While all these approaches agree that a strong argument may be accepted if it is attacked by a weaker argument, they disagree on whether the weak attacker should be rejected or not. Let us say it differently, in Example 2, the works [2, 5, 10] return one stable extension which contains both the attacker and the attacked argument, that is the set {a, b}. This extension violates one of the basic requirements of acceptability semantics, the conflict-freeness of extensions. In [4] , the authors have argued that this is undesirable since the intuition behind an extension is that it encodes a 'coherent position'. This coherence is captured by the notion of conflict-freeness in acceptability semantics. That is why it is at the heart of all semantics. The authors have then proposed an alternative solution in which the argument a is rejected and the only stable extension of the framework F 2 is {b}. In this paper, we argue that the extensions of an argumentation framework should be conflict-free, otherwise the whole theory of argumentation collapses. We propose four basic postulates that should be satisfied by any approach for preference-based argumentation that models the first role of preferences. The first postulates states that the extensions of a PAF should be conflict-free.
Postulate 1 (Conflict-freeness) Let T = (A, R, ≥) be a PAF and Ext(T ) it set of extensions. Each extension E ∈ Ext(T ) should be conflict-free wrt R.
The second postulate says that when there are no critical attacks, then the output of the PAF should coincide with that of a system without preferences. The reason is that we suppose that a PAF is built over a well-founded basic system (i.e. the system constructed only from a pair (A, R)).
Postulate 2 (Recovering existing semantics) Let T = (A, R, ≥) be a PAF and F = (A, R) its basic version. If there are no critical attacks in T , then Ext(T ) = Ext(F ) where Ext(F ) is the set of the extensions of F under a given semantics.
The third postulate shows how to privilege a strong argument over a weak attacker.
Postulate 3 (Critical attacks) Let
The last postulate states that attacks should win when they are not critical.
Postulate 4 (Normal attacks)
Let T = (A, R, ≥) be a PAF and a, b ∈ A. Let E 1 , E 2 be two conflict-free (wrt R) subsets of A s.t. E 1 = E ∪ {a} and E 2 = E ∪ {b}. If aRb and not(bRa) and not(b > a), then E 2 / ∈ Ext(T ).
Works in [2, 5, 10] , proceed by removing critical attacks from an argumentation graph and applying Dung's semantics on the remaining sub-graph. It is easy to show that when there are no critical attacks, the two graphs coincide.
It can be shown that that such an approach violates the conflict-freeness in some cases when the attack relation is not symmetric, and the third postulate (for example for admissible semantics), while it satisfies Postulates 2 and 4.
verifies Postulates 2 and 4.
When the attack relation is symmetric, Postulates 1 and 3 are verified.
Proposition 2 Let
T = (A, R, ≥) be a PAF s.t. Ext(T ) = Ext(F ) where F = (A, R r ). If R is symmetric,
then T verifies Postulates 1 and 3.
This means that when the attack relation is symmetric, all the postulates are verified. However, the following example shows that the result may still need to be refined. A = {a, b, c, d}, R = {(a, c), (c, a), (a, d), (d, a), (b, c), (c, b), (b, d) , (d, b)} and a > c, b > d. The extensions of this PAF are {a, b} and {c, d}. However, {a, b} is clearly preferred to {c, d}. Thus, the frameworks developed in [2, 5, 10] do not take into account the second role of preferences even when the attack relation is symmetric.
Example 4 Let
In the recent paper ( [4] ) an approach has been proposed which verifies all postulates.
Proposition 3
The class of PAFs defined in [4] verifies Postulates 1 -4.
Refining AFs by preferences
Until now, we have studied the first role of preferences. We have particularly shown that "some" preferences should be taken into account for computing the standard solutions of an argumentation framework. Examples 1 and 3 show that standard solutions may need to be narrowed down using the remaining preferences. What is worth noticing is that a refinement amounts to compare subsets of arguments. In Example 1, the so-called democratic relation, d , is used for comparing the two sets {a, c} and {b, d}:
Relation d is not unique and different relations can be used as shown next.
Example 1 (Cont): Let us consider again F 1 and assume that a ≈ b and c > d. According to relation d , the two extensions {a, c} and {b, d} are incomparable. However, since a ≈ b and c > d, it is clear that one could prefer {a, c} to {b, d}.
Let us now define the basic properties that such a relation should satisfy. The first property ensures that the refinement relation is a preorder, that is reflexive and transitive. Note that these are the basic properties of any preference relation.
Postulate 5 (Preorder) Let A be a set of arguments. A refinement relation on P(A) is a preorder (reflexive and transitive).
The second property ensures that the relation privileges sets that contain strong arguments (wrt).
Postulate 6 (Privileging strong arguments)
Let T = (A, R, ≥) be a PAF, a, b ∈ A and E 1 , E 2 ∈ P(A). If E 1 = E ∪ {a} and E 2 = E ∪ {b} and a > b, then E 1 E 2 .
Notation:
The maximal elements of a set S wrt. a given relation are defined as follows:
Property 2. The democratic relation verifies the two postulates 5 and 6.
In this section, we propose a particular framework which models both roles of preferences and verifies all the postulates introduced in this paper. The framework follows two steps: at the first step, it computes the standard solutions by handling correctly the available critical attacks. These solutions are then refined using an appropriate refinement relation. In order to make the paper easy to read, we will call PAF the framework which computes the standard solutions and rich PAF the one which refines the results of the PAF.
Definition 6 (Rich PAFs) A rich PAF is a tuple T = (A, R, ≥, ) where A is a set of arguments, R ⊆ A × A is an attack relation, ≥ ⊆ A × A is a (partial or total) preorder and ⊆ P(A) × P(A) is a relation which verifies Postulates 5 and 6. The extensions of T (under a given semantics) are elements of Max(S, ), where S is the set of extensions (under the same semantics) of the PAF (A, R, ≥).
In what follows, we propose a new approach that handles correctly critical attacks (i.e. which satisfies the four postulates introduced in section 4). We exploit for that a simple result that is proved recently in [4] . In that paper, the authors have proposed a new approach for taking into account preferences and which prevents the shortcomings of existing ones, namely the problem of conflicting extensions. The basic idea is to integrate preferences in the definition of semantics. A refinement of stable semantics is defined as a dominance relation which compares sets of arguments. The best sets wrt that relation are the extensions of the PAF. In that paper, the authors have shown that all their extensions are conflict-free and Postulates 2, 3 and 4 as satisfied as well. They have also shown an important result for semantics that refine stable one with preferences. The result says that the extensions of their approach (i.e. the best sets wrt the dominance relation) are exactly the stable extensions of the basic argumentation framework in which each critical attack is inverted. In what follows, we show that this idea can be generalized to any acceptability semantics.
The idea of inverting the arrows of critical attacks in an argumentation graph allows to take into account the preference (between the two arguments involved in a critical attack) and in the same time the conflict between the two arguments of the attack is represented. The intuition behind this is that an attack between two arguments represents two things: i) an incoherence between the two arguments (in logic-based systems, it captures inconsistency between the supports of the two arguments), and ii) a kind of preference determined by the direction of the attack. Thus, in our approach, the direction of the arrow represents a real preference between arguments. Moreover, the conflict is kept between the two arguments. Dung's acceptability semantics are then applied on the modified graph. In our approach, standard solutions are computed by the following preference-based framework. From Definition 7, it is clear that if a PAF has no critical attacks, then the repaired framework coincides with the basic one.
Definition 7 (PAF)
Property 3. Let T = (A, R, ≥) be a PAF. If T has no critical attacks, then R r = R.
This property shows also that when a PAF has no critical attacks, then preferences do not play any role in the evaluation process.
Our approach does not suffer from the drawback of existing ones. Indeed, it delivers conflict-free extensions of arguments. Thus, it satisfies Postulate 1.
Proposition 4
Let T = (A, R, ≥) be a PAF and E 1 , . . . , E n its extensions under a given semantics. For all i = 1, . . . , n, E i is conflict-free wrt. R.
The next result confirms that our approach is well-founded in the sense that acceptable arguments are defended by "good" arguments. Moreover, it verifies the orderings between the attack relation and the preference relation, meaning that it verifies Postulates 3 and 4.
Proposition 5 Let T = (A, R, ≥) be a PAF.
The fact of inverting the arrows of critical attacks in an argumentation graph does not affect the status of arguments that are not related to the arguments of those attacks. This means that our approach has no side effects. Before presenting the formal result, let us first give a useful definition.
Definition 8
Let F = (A, R) be an AF and a, b ∈ A. The arguments a and b are related in F iff there is exists a finite sequence a 1 , . . . , a n of arguments such that a 1 = a, a n = b and for all i = 1, . . . , n − 1, either (a i , a i+1 ) ∈ R or (a i+1 , a i ) ∈ R. Our approach privileges the strongest arguments. Indeed, we show that these arguments are skeptically accepted when they are not conflicting. If such a strong argument is not skeptically accepted, then it is for sure attacked (wrt. R) by another strongest argument. Before presenting the formal result, let us define the strongest arguments (or the top elements) wrt. a relation ≥.
Definition 9 (Maximal elements) Let O be a set of objects and ≥⊆ O×O is a (partial or total) preorder. The maximal elements of
Property 4. Let T = (A, R, ≥) be a PAF s.t ≥ is complete 1 .
-If Max(A, ≥) is conflict-free (wrt. R), then ∀a ∈ Max(A, ≥) :
• a is skeptically accepted in T wrt. preferred and grounded semantics.
• if T has at least one stable extension, then a is skeptically accepted wrt. stable semantics. -If a is not skeptically accepted (under preferred or grounded semantics), or there exists at least one stable extension and a is not skeptically accepted, then ∃b ∈
The following result shows that when the preference relation ≥ is a linear order (i.e. reflexive, antisymmetric, transitive and complete), then the corresponding PAF has a unique stable/preferred extension. Moreover, this extension is computed in O(n 2 ) time where |A| = n. It is clear that in this case, there is no need to refine the result.
Proposition 7
Let T = (A, R, ≥) be a PAF s.t. R is irreflexive and ≥ is a linear order.
-T has exactly one stable extension.
-Stable, preferred and grounded extensions of T coincide.
Let us now see what happens in case the attack relation is symmetric. The following result shows that our approach returns the same results as the approach developed in [2, 5] . This means that inverting the arrows or removing them will lead to the same result.
Property 5. Let T = (A, R, ≥) be a PAF where R is symmetric. Extensions of T coincide with extensions of (A, R ′ ) (under the same semantics) where
We can also show that when the attack relation is symmetric, the extensions of a PAF are a subset of those of its basic framework. This means that preferences filter the extensions. However, the result is not optimal since it may need to be refined again as shown in Example 4.
Proposition 8 Let T = (A, R, ≥) be a PAF where R is symmetric. If E ⊆ A is a preferred (stable) extension of system T then E is a preferred (stable) extension of (A, R).
Recall that this result is not true in case the attack relation is not symmetric as shown in Example 2.
The following result characterizes the extensions of (A, R) that are discarded in a PAF when R is symmetric. The idea is that an extension is discarded iff some argument outside it is strictly preferred to any arguments of that extension with which it conflicts.
to avoid the problem of conflicting extensions and then to refine the result with the preference relation already mentioned in [7] . The first suggestion is certainly not realistic, especially in light of new results in the literature stating that symmetric relations should be avoided in logic-based argumentation systems.
Conclusion
This paper has studied deeply the difference between the two roles that preferences may play in an AF. We have shown that preferences intervene both for computing what is called standard solutions in nonmonotonic reasoning formalisms and for refining that result, and choosing a subset of those solutions. We have shown that the two roles are completely independent and should be taken into account in two steps. Main postulates that any approach modeling each role have been proposed. Finally, we have developed a particular framework that considers both roles. The framework satisfies the proposed postulates and its properties show that it is well-founded.
